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Abstract
We provide a Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA)
when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in
aggregating many items. We rst assume that each local bidder values only a specic
item, e.g. the license for the region where it has monopoly power, and that global bidders'
valuation functions are convex. For this environment we show that a global bidder faces
an exposure problem with adverse consequences for revenue and eciency. In the limit
when the number of items grows large, the SAA is revenue and eciency equivalent to
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We extend our analysis to include the case
where items are substitutes for local bidders, so that price arbitrage will occur as observed
in many spectrum auctions. This environment, which combines substitutes and comple-
ments, results in an aggravated exposure problem. Consequently, the SAA is no longer
ecient and may yield dramatically lower revenues than the VCG mechanism. Finally, we
relax the assumption that global bidders' valuation functions are convex by considering an
environment with medium-sized global bidders who demand fewer than all items. We show
that global bidders divide the market at low prices when market sharing is feasible while
they engage in mutually destructive bidding when there is a tting problem. In both cases,
the SAA again underperforms relative to the VCG mechanism.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, governments around the world have employed auctions to award licenses for
the rights to operate in certain markets. The spectrum auctions conducted by the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) provide a particularly prominent example. In the FCC
auctions, telecom rms compete for blocks of frequencies (typically on the order of 10-20MHz)
dened over certain geographic areas.1 The format pioneered by the FCC is the simultaneous
ascending auction (SAA), which is a dynamic, multi-round format in which the items are put
up for sale simultaneously and the auction closes only when bidding on all items has stopped.
The SAA has become the standard to conduct large-scale, large-stakes spectrum auctions and
has generated close to $80 billion for the US Treasury and hundreds of billions worldwide.
An important property of the SAA is that when items are substitutes and bidding is \straight-
forward," i.e. in each round of the auction bidders place minimum acceptable bids on those
licenses that provide the highest current prots, then prices converge to competitive equilibrium
prices and a fully ecient outcome results (Milgrom, 2000; Gul and Stacchetti, 2000). However,
in many of the FCC auctions there are synergies between licenses for adjacent geographic regions,
and bidders' values for combinations of licenses exceed the sum of individual license values. For
example, the bid regressions reported by Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee, and McMillan (1997) show
that the highest losing bid on a license is higher if the bidder who placed the bid has won or
eventually wins a license. Bajari and Fox (2009) apply a structural econometrics model to data
from FCC auction #5 and nd evidence for substantial value complementarities: they estimate
that the value of a nationwide package is 69% more than the sum of underlying values.2 Value
complementarities were considered even more important in the recently conducted FCC auction
#73, where potential entrants, e.g. Google, competed against established incumbents such as
Verizon and AT&T for highly valuable 700MHz spectrum.3 Most experts believed that an en-
trant could have a viable business plan only if it would acquire a \national footprint," i.e. a set
of licenses covering the entire United States.
In this paper, we consider an environment where one or more global bidders (entrants) have
super-additive values for the licenses, i.e. for global bidders licenses are complements rather than
substitutes. For this environment an often cited problem of the item-by-item competition that
occurs under SAA is that global bidders face an exposure problem { when competing aggressively
for a package, global bidders may incur a loss when winning only an inferior subset. Foreseeing
1The dierent frequency bands that have been put up for sale in the 73 FCC auctions since 1994 accommodate
dierent usages, including wireless and cellular phone applications, mobile television broadcasting, and air-to-
ground communication. See http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_all.
2FCC auction #5 (the \C-block auction") was conducted in 1995 and generated over $10 billion in revenue.
3FCC auction #73 was conducted in 2008 and generated a record $19 billion in revenue. It was the rst
combinatorial auction conducted by the FCC, based on hierarchically structured packages (Rothkopf, Pekec, and
Harstad, 1998) and a novel pricing rule (Goeree and Holt, 2010).
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the possibility of being \exposed," global bidders may decide to bid cautiously and drop out early,
which could adversely aect the auction's revenue and eciency.4 For example, the counterfactual
experiments conducted by Bajari and Fox (2009) demonstrate that in FCC auction #5 only 50%
of the total available surplus was captured.5 In addition, a substantial body of laboratory evidence
documents the negative impact of the exposure problem on the SAA's performance (see, e.g.,
Brunner et al., 2010, and references therein).
Despite the potential shortcomings of the item-by-item competition underlying SAA, it has
been the preferred choice for most spectrum auctions. Alternatives allowing for package bids were
either considered too complex or thought to be prone to \free riding" (Milgrom, 2000).6 Fur-
thermore, the familiar Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which guarantees full eciency
even in the presence of value complementarities, is generally dismissed because of its perverse
revenue properties. In particular, the VCG mechanism can lead to non-core outcomes that result
in high bidder prots and low seller revenue. Moreover, seller revenue can decrease when more
bidders participate. The following three-bidder, two-item example provided by Ausubel and Mil-
grom (2006) illustrates these shortcomings. Suppose local bidder 1 is interested only in item A,
local bidder 2 is interested only in item B, the global bidder 3 is interested only in the package
AB, and all bidders' values (for individual items or the package) are $1 billion. The VCG mech-
anism assigns the items eciently to bidders 1 and 2, but at zero prices!7 Besides generating
the lowest possible revenue, this outcome is outside the core as the seller and global bidder can
form a blocking coalition. Moreover, excluding one of the local bidders, raises the seller's revenue
to $1 billion. These perverse revenue properties, shown here in a complete-information setting,
carry over to the Bayesian framework studied in this paper where bidders' values are private
information (see Example 1 in Section 2.1).
This paper compares the SAA and VCG mechanisms in settings with value complementari-
ties.8 Our approach diers from previous studies of the SAA, which assume that bidders have
complete information and that the items for sale are substitutes (e.g. Milgrom, 2000). Either as-
4Milgrom (2000) argues that the dierent per-unit-of-bandwidth prices observed for small and large licenses
in the Dutch DCS-1800 auction reect the exposure problem. A similar observation applies to the recent FCC
auction #66, where 12 large (F-band) licenses providing 20MHz of nationwide coverage sold for $4.2 billion while
734 small (A-band) licenses also providing 20MHz of nationwide coverage went for $2.3 billion.
5Bajari and Fox (2009) show that surplus could have been doubled had the FCC oered large regional licenses
or a nationwide package in addition to individual licenses.
6In package auctions, local bidders who drop out early (\free ride") may earn windfall prots if other local
bidders remain active and outbid the global bidders. After all, a local bidder's concern is simply whether as a
group they meet the threshold set by a global bidder's package bid. Of course, if all local bidders free ride this
threshold may not be met with adverse eects for revenue and eciency { this is known as the threshold problem.
7Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) develop this example further in a theorem that shows that bidders' Vickrey
payos are the highest payos over all points in the core.
8We compare the SAA to VCG not because the latter is a serious contender for practical applications, see e.g.
Rothkopf (2007) for (thirteen) reasons why not. But despite its shortcomings in practice, VCG is the relevant
benchmark because of its broad theoretical applicability. Since it is dominant-strategy implementable it can
readily be used to study incomplete-information environments with multiple units and value complementarities.
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sumption, however, precludes the possibility of an exposure problem for global bidders interested
in aggregating many items. One contribution of this paper is the introduction of a tractable
model that allows for a Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis of the exposure problem in the SAA.
We rst consider an environment where global bidders with super-additive (convex) valuations
compete with local bidders that each value a dierent item, e.g. when local bidders are interested
only in the license for the region where they have local monopoly power. The setup is general in
that it allows for arbitrary numbers of local and global bidders, arbitrary distributions of local
and global bidders' values over one-dimensional types, and a general convex valuation function
to capture global bidders' value complementarities. We provide a recursive characterization of
equilibrium bidding in this setting, which enables us to quantify the eects of the exposure
problem on eciency and revenue. In particular, due to the exposure problem the SAA is not
ecient and the eciency loss is borne by the global bidder. The SAA shares the poor revenue-
generating features of the VCG mechanism, e.g. its revenues may be low and may decline with
the number of bidders. Finally, the similarities between the SAA and VCG mechanisms in this
environment become even stronger as the number of items grows: the two mechanisms are revenue
and eciency equivalent in the limit.
The intuition why the SAA is able to produce full eciency in the limit is that global bidders
face no exposure with respect to each other because of the convexity assumption and they face
no exposure with respect to the local bidders whose behavior becomes deterministic by the law
of large numbers. Importantly, however, the global bidders can avoid the exposure problem only
because of the dynamic nature of the SAA: it allows the global bidder with the second-highest
value to drop out before any of the local bidders that are part of the ecient allocation do. In
contrast, in a sealed-bid version of the SAA, global bidders face an exposure problem and, in
equilibrium, the highest-value global bidder wins fewer items than is socially optimal.
Next, we relax the assumptions that local bidders value a specic item or that global bidders'
valuations are convex, and demonstrate that under these more realistic conditions the SAA
generally underperforms vis-a-vis the VCG mechanism. We extend our recursive characterization
of equilibrium bidding in the SAA to the case where items are perfect substitutes for local bidders
so that price arbitrage will occur (as observed in many spectrum auctions). We demonstrate that
for this environment, which combines complements for the global bidders with substitutes for the
local bidders, the exposure problem is much worse and the performance of the SAA suers as
a result. In particular, when the number of items grows large, it may be optimal for the global
bidder to drop out immediately with dramatic consequences for eciency and revenue.
Finally, we study a setting with two \medium-sized" global bidders with non-convex valuation
functions. When the global bidders each need less than half the items, they compete head-to-
head only at very low prices after which they compete only with the local bidders. In other
words, the global bidders follow a strategy of mutual forbearance and divide the market at low
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prices. In contrast, when the global bidders each need more than half the items, the equilibrium
involves mutually destructive bidding: global bidders may bid above their values and even the
winning bidder may incur a loss.9 We show that the SAA again performs worse than the VCG
mechanism, whether or not market sharing is feasible.
1.1. Related Literature
Auctions in which bidders have synergistic values have often been analyzed within a complete-
information setting, see, for instance, Szentes and Rosenthal (2003a,b). There are relatively few
theoretical papers that apply the standard Bayesian framework of incomplete information. An
early exception is Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) who study the simultaneous sealed-bid second-
price auction (SSA). Similar to our bidding environment, local bidders in their setup are interested
in only one object while global bidders are interested in multiple objects for which they have
synergistic values. Krishna and Rosenthal derive an explicit solution for the case of two items
and show how it varies with the synergy level. They also discuss the extension to more than two
items and provide a numerical comparison of revenue in alternative formats. Other papers that
study the SSA include Rosenthal and Wang (1996), who allow for common values and partially
overlapping bidder interests, and a more recent paper by Chernomaz and Levin (2008) who use
theory and experiments to analyze the SSA and a package bidding variant when local bidders
have identical values.
Ascending formats have been analyzed either assuming a clock price that rises in response
to excess demand or assuming that bidders can name their own bids (i.e. submit any bid they
want). In the latter category, Brusco and Lopomo (2002) demonstrate the possibility of collusive
demand-reduction equilibria in the SAA. They nd that increasing the number of bidders and
objects narrows the scope for collusion. Brusco and Lopomo (2009) analyze the eects of budget
constraints. Zheng (2008) shows that jump bidding may serve as a signaling device to alleviate
the ineciencies that result from the exposure problem. Albano, Germano, and Lovo (2006)
analyze a (\Japanese style") clock version of the ascending auction for a setting with only two
items. They note the equivalence between the SAA and a \survival auction" and point out that
many of the collusive or signaling equilibria that occur when bidders can name their bids do not
arise for the clock variant of the SAA.
1.2. Organization
Section 2 provides an equilibrium analysis of the SAA when each local bidder is interested in
a dierent item and global bidders' values are convex. We start by considering a single global
9For a complete-information environment, Bykowsky, Cull, and Ledyard (2000) have argued the possibility of
such behavior using the concept of a \local Nash equilibrium."
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bidder (Section 2.1) and determine the eects of the exposure problem for eciency (Section
2.2). In Section 2.3 we extend the result to multiple global bidders. In Section 3 we establish the
equivalence of the SAA and VCG mechanisms as the number of items grows large. In Section 4
we demonstrate the poor performance of the SAA in an environment that combines substitutes
and complements (Section 4.1) and in an environment with two medium-sized global bidders
with non-convex valuation functions (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Section 5 concludes and Appendix
A contains all proofs.
2. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
Consider an environment with n  1 local bidders and K  1 global bidders who compete
for n items labeled 1; : : : ; n. We assume that local bidder i values only item i, e.g. the license
for the region where she has monopoly power.
Assumption 1 (non-substitutability). Local bidder i = 1; : : : ; n is interested only in item i.
Local bidder i's value for item i is denoted vi. The local bidders' values are identically and
independently distributed according to F (), with support [0,1].10
Global bidder j's value for winning k items is (k)V j, where the V j are identically and
independently distributed according to G() with support [0; n],11 and (k) is increasing in k
with (0) = 0 and (n) = 1. We dene the \marginal values" V jk = ((n+1  k) (n  k))V j
for k = 1; : : : ; n so that global bidder j's marginal value of the rst item is V jn , of the second
item is V jn 1, : : :, and of the n-th item is V
j
1 .
Assumption 2 (convexity). For global bidder j = 1; : : : ; K, the marginal values form a non-
decreasing sequence V jn  V jn 1  : : :  V j1 . Moreover, we say that
(i) values are \additive" when V jn = : : : = V
j
1 = V
j=n.
(ii) values exhibit \complementarities" when V jn < : : : < V
j
2 < V
j
1 .
(iii) values exhibit \extreme complementarities" when V jn = : : : = V
j
2 = 0 and V
j
1 = V
j.
The SAA is modeled using n price clocks that tick upward (at equal and constant pace) when
two or more bidders accept the current price levels. If only one bidder accepts the new price for
10The assumption of a [0,1] support is without loss of generality since we can rescale local bidders' values. The
symmetry assumption can be relaxed at the expense of more cumbersome notation as can the assumption of a
single local bidder per item.
11We restrict the support of the global bidders' values to [0; n] because global bidders with values higher than
n face no exposure problem and always win all items. The assumption that global bidders' values are identically
distributed can be relaxed see Remark 1 below.
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an item then this bidder becomes the provisional winner for the item and its price clock pauses.12
If, at a later point, others decide to accept the new price for the item then its price clock resumes
and the current provisional winner is unassigned. In other words, bidders can switch back and
forth between items as long as the auction has not ended, i.e. as long as some new price is
accepted by more than one bidder or some provisional winner is outbid. Once the auction ends,
provisional winners become nal winners and pay the nal prices they accepted for the items
they win. To expedite the auction, a simplied activity rule is imposed: the total number of
items bidders compete for (i.e. bid for or provisionally win) can never rise.
We assume that local bidders compete only for the item they are interested in so that they
have a dominant strategy to bid up to their values.13 In contrast, global bidders are interested
in and compete for all items. As a result, prices rise uniformly and a global bidder's optimal
strategy is characterized by a single drop-out level. A global bidder's strategy is complicated
by the fact that when competing aggressively for a package, the global bidder may suer a loss
when she is able to win only an inferior subset. Foreseeing the possibility of being \exposed" and
incurring a loss, the global bidder may decide to bid cautiously and drop out early, which could
adversely aect the auction's revenue and eciency | this is known as the exposure problem.
2.1. Single Global Bidder
We write BKk (V ) to denote a global bidder's bidding function when K global bidders and
k out of n local bidders are active. A global bidder's optimal drop-out level is then given by
maxfp;BKk (V )g, where p denotes the current price level. For ease of notation we simply refer
to BKk (V ) as the optimal drop-out level, where it is implicitly understood that the global bidder
nds it unprotable to stay in the auction and prefers to drop out immediately when BKk (V ) < p.
It will prove useful to introduce the notation Fk(vjp) = 1  ((1 F (v))=(1 F (p)))k, which is the
conditional probability that the minimum of k active local bidders' values is less than v given
that the minimum is no less than p. In this section we focus on the case of a single global bidder
(K = 1).
Suppose rst that there is only one item for sale (k = 1). If the current price level is p and
the global bidder chooses a drop-out price level B11(V ), her expected prots are
11(V; p) =
Z B11(V )
p
(V1   v1)dF1(v1jp);
with v1 the local bidder's value. The integrand 
1
1(V; v1) = V1  v1 is the global bidder's prot if
the local bidder drops out at price v1. Clearly, the global bidder's expected prot is maximized
by choosing the drop-out price B11(V ) such that 
1
1(V;B
1
1(V )) = 0, or B
1
1(V ) = V1.
12If no bidder accepts the new price, then the provisional winner is chosen randomly among the bidders that
accepted the previous price. Such \ties" occur with probability 0 in the Bayes-Nash equilibria described below.
13In many FCC auction, bidders have to state on which items they will bid prior to the auction.
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Next, consider the case k = 2. Suppose the current price level is p and the global bidder
chooses a drop-out price level B12(V ) (for both items), her expected prot is non-trivial only
when the local bidder with the lower value drops out before B12(V ). Once a local bidder drops
out, the global bidder faces competition only in a single market and she is willing to bid up to
V1 in this market. The reason is that her prot for the item on which bidding stopped is sunk
(i.e. independent of whether or not she wins an additional item). The global bidder's expected
prot can be written as
12(V; p) =
Z B12(V )
p
nZ V1
v2
(V1   v1)dF1(v1jv2) + (V2   v2)
o
dF2(v2jp);
where v2 (v1) denotes the lower (higher) of the local bidders' values. The integrand 
1
2(V; v2) =R V1
v2
(V1   v1)dF1(v1jv2) + (V2   v2) is the global bidder's expected prot conditional on the local
bidder with the lower value dropping out at v2. The rst term arises when the global bidder wins
the remaining item, i.e. when v1  v2 is less than V1 (since the global bidder bids up to V1 for
the remaining item) in which case the global bidder wins the additional item and pays v1 for it.
The second term indicates that the global bidder prots V2  v2 from the item for which bidding
stopped rst, irrespective of whether she wins the additional item.
Again, the global bidder's optimal drop-out level follows from 12(V;B
1
2(V )) = 0, which yields
B12(V ) = V2+
1
1(V;B
1
2(V )). Note that the global's prot can be recursively expressed using the
prot for the single local-bidder case: 12(V; p) =
R B12(V )
p f11(V; v2) + (V2   v2)gdF2(v2jp). This
recursive relation can be generalized to the case of more than two items.
Proposition 1. The global bidder's optimal drop-out level solves B1k(V ) = Vk+
1
k 1(V;B
1
k(V )),
where the payos satisfy the recursive relation
1k(V; p) =
Z B1k(V )
p
f1k 1(V; vk) + (Vk   vk)gdFk(vkjp); (2.1)
with 10(V; p) = 0.
The proposition implies a set of xed-point equations from which the optimal bids can be solved
recursively: B11(V ) = V1, B
1
2(V ) = V2 +
R B11(V )
B12(V )
(V1  v1)dF1(v1jB12(V )), etc. The intuition behind
the bidding functions in Proposition 1 stems form a familiar break-even condition: when a license
is marginally won at price B1n(V ), its value plus the expected payos from continuing (knowing
all remaining local bidders' values exceed B1n(V )) must balance this cost.
Example 1. To illustrate, suppose n = 2 and the local bidders' values are uniformly distributed
on [0,1]. We have B11(V ) = V1 and a simple calculation shows that
B12(V ) =
1
3

1 + V1 + V2  
q
(2  V1   V2)2   3(1 min(1; V1))2

(2.2)
7
0 1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 1. The Global Bidder's Optimal Drop-Out Level When Complementarities are Extreme: B1k(V )
(left panel) for k = 1; : : : ; 5 and B2k(V ) (right panel) for k = 0; : : : ; 5 (with B
2
5(V ) = B
2
4(V ) = B
1
5(V )).
For the case of extreme complementarities (V2 = 0, V1 = V ), these bidding functions are illus-
trated by the two left-most lines in the left panel of Figure 1 (the right panel will be discussed
in Section 2.3). The left panel also shows the optimal bidding functions B1n(V ) for higher values
of n, which can be used to illustrate some of the perverse revenue properties of the SAA. For in-
stance, suppose that also the global bidder's value is uniformly distributed on [0,1], then revenues
of the SAA are (0.33, 0.27, 0.087) with n = 1; 2; 3 local bidders respectively. The corresponding
revenue numbers for the VCG mechanism are (1
3
, 1
4
, 1
10
). To summarize, the revenue of the SAA
can fall as more bidders enter the auction and can be lower than that of the VCG mechanism.14
2.2. Constrained Eciency
The optimal drop-out levels of the global bidder shown in the left panel of Figure 1 illustrate
the eects of the exposure problem in equilibrium. Consider, for instance, the case of ve local
bidders and suppose the global bidder is equally strong in expectation, i.e. the global bidder's
value for the package is 2.5. When all ve local bidders are active, the global bidder drops out
when the price for each item is 0.2 (see the lowest curve in the left panel of Figure 1), which
means that the global bidder drops out at 40% of the package value! This does not necessarily
mean, however, that eciency is negatively aected. The lowest curve in the left panel of Figure
1 only applies when all ve local bidders are active, and if this occurs at an item price of 0.2 then
the sum of the local bidders' expected values is 3 (not 2.5). Hence, eciency may be improved
when the global bidder drops out (especially when complementarities are extreme, as in Figure
1, and the global bidder derives no value from winning less than ve items).
Compared to the fully ecient VCG mechanism, there are two potential sources of inef-
ciencies in the SAA. First, when global bidders drop out, not all local bidders' values have
14When the global bidder's value is uniformly distributed on [0; n], SAA revenues are (0:33; 0:60; 0:85) for
n = 1; 2; 3 compared to (0:33; 0:58; 0:83) for the VCG mechanism.
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been revealed. Due to this residual uncertainty there are necessarily some ex post ineciencies
in the SAA (unlike the VCG mechanism where the allocation is based on ex post information
about bidders' values). Second, global bidders' prot-maximizing drop-out levels may dier from
welfare-maximizing drop-out levels. Distinguishing these two sources of ineciency is useful in
that the rst one becomes irrelevant with many items since then the uncertainty about local
bidders' values vanishes because of the law of large numbers. To quantify the second source of
ineciency, we say that the global bidder's drop-out level is constrained ecient when it max-
imizes expected welfare, which is based on a mixture of ex post information (values of bidders
that have dropped out) and ex ante information (values of active bidders).
To derive the constrained ecient drop-out level for the global bidder consider rst the case
of a single item (k = 1). A social planner would choose B11(V ) to maximize
W 11 (V; p) =
Z B11(V )
p
V1dF1(v1jp) +
Z 1
B11(V )
v1dF1(v1jp)
where the rst (second) term corresponds to the global (local) bidder winning the item. Compar-
ing the expression for welfare to the global's prot 11(V; p) in Section 2.1 shows that W
1
1 (V; p) =
11(V; p) + E(vjv > p). In other words, welfare and the global bidder's prot dier only by
a constant independent of B11(V ). Hence, the prot-maximizing drop-out levels also maximize
welfare. We next generalize this to an arbitrary number of items.
Proposition 2. The global bidder's drop-out level is constrained ecient.
As in the benchmark VCG mechanism, individual and social incentives are aligned in the SAA.
The dierence is that in the VCG mechanism all values are revealed at once, which allows for a
fully ecient outcome. In contrast, the SAA is only constrained ecient because of the residual
uncertainty the global bidder faces about the values of active local bidders.
The eciency gain in the VCG mechanism does not benet the seller, however, but only the
global bidder. Let W SAA(V ), RSAA(V ), SAA(V ), and SAA(V ) denote the expected welfare,
expected revenue, expected global bidder's prot, and expected local bidders' total prot under
the SAA mechanism, where the (ex ante) expectation is taken over local bidders' values only.
Similar denitions apply with respect to the VCG mechanism.
Proposition 3. The eciency gain of the VCG mechanism accrues to the global bidder
W V CG(V ) W SAA(V ) = V CG(V )  SAA(V ) (2.3)
while the dierence in seller's revenue accrues to the local bidders
RSAA(V ) RV CG(V ) = V CG(V )  SAA(V ) (2.4)
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2.3. Multiple Global Bidders
A global bidder's optimal bidding function when there are multiple global bidders follows
from the same `break even' logic that underlies the result of Proposition 1. First, consider the
case of K = 2 global bidders and suppose k out the n local bidders are still active: the optimal
bid B2k(V ) is determined by requiring that at this price level the marginal costs and benets
of staying in a little longer (i.e. by bidding as of type V + ) cancel. There are two possible
marginal events: one occurs when a local drops out, in which case the other global bidder has a
value no less than V . Hence, the continuation prots for a global bidder with value V are zero
in this case: 2k 1(V;B
2
k(V )) = 0. Alternatively, the other global bidder drops out, in which case
the continuation prots are given by 1k(V;B
2
k(V )). Furthermore, the global bidder now wins
all the (n   k) items for which the local bidders had already dropped out at a price of B2k(V )
for each item. Finally, when there are K  3 global bidders, the only non-vanishing marginal
term results from K   1 global bidders dropping out at the same time, which produces the same
marginal equation as when K = 2.
Proposition 4. The global bidder's optimal drop-out level satises BKk (V ) = B
2
k(V ) for K  2
and
1k(V;B
2
k(V )) +
nX
`=k+1
(V`  B2k(V )) = 0; (2.5)
where the 1k(V; p) satisfy the recursion relations of Proposition 1.
It is worthwhile pointing out a few cases: k = 0 occurs when all local bidders have dropped out
and two (or more) global bidders are active. We then have B20(V ) = V=n since at a price of V=n
the global bidder is indierent between winning nothing and winning everything at that price.
For k = n we have 1n(V;B
2
n(V )) = 0 so B
2
n(V ) = B
1
n(V ). Likewise, for k = n   1 we have
1n 1(V;B
2
n 1(V )) + Vn = B
2
n 1(V ) so B
2
n 1(V ) = B
1
n(V ) (see Proposition 1). In other words,
B2n(V ) = B
2
n 1(V ) = B
1
n(V ): (2.6)
This result may seem surprising given that B2n 1(V ) is determined by the marginal event when
the other global bidder drops out, while B2n(V ) is determined by the marginal event when the
other global bidder and a local bidder drop out. Nevertheless, in both scenarios the optimal
drop-out level follows from considering the cost and benet of winning the rst item, which
yields B1n(V ) as the optimal drop-out level.
Example 1 (continued). The right panel of Figure 1 shows the global bidder's optimal drop-
out levels B2n(V ) for 0  n  5 when local bidders' values are uniform and complementarities
are extreme. Note that there are ve (not 6) lines since B25(V ) = B
2
4(V ), see (2.6), and that
B2k(V )  B1k+1(V )  B1k(V ) for all k.
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As we show next, the ranking of the global bidders' optimal drop-out levels holds more generally.
Competition from other global bidders aggravates the exposure problem and lowers a global
bidder's optimal drop-out level: B2k(V )  B1k+1(V ) for all k (see the proof of Proposition 2
continued). The fact that global bidders are more cautious when facing competition from other
global bidders does not hurt constrained eciency. On the contrary, it implies that global bidders
who do not have the highest value, and who should therefore not win any items in the optimal
allocation, drop out before local bidders that should win items in the optimal allocation do.
Proposition 2 (continued). Global bidders' drop-out levels are constrained ecient for K  1.
As we show in the next section, the dierences between the VCG and SAA mechanisms vanish
when the number of items grows large. Full limit eciency of the SAA can be understood from
the aforementioned distinction between the two sources of ineciency. In the limit, the residual
uncertainty about active local bidders' values disappears, which turns the constrained eciency
result of Proposition 2 into a full eciency result.
3. Large Auctions
In many applications of the SAA the number of items is very large, e.g. in some of the
FCC spectrum auctions more than a thousand items are sold. In this section, we show how
our approach extends to large auctions. In particular, we derive the optimal drop-out levels
when multiple global bidders are active, BK(V ) for K  2, and show that they are less than
B1(V ), which applies with only a single global bidder. Since in large auctions there is no residual
uncertainty about active local bidders' values, this result implies that the SAA becomes fully
ecient in the limit. In addition, we show that in large auctions the SAA generates the same
prots for the seller and the bidders as the VCG mechanism.
Let V denote the highest of the global bidders' values and vn  : : :  v1 denote the (ordered)
local bidders' values. When the highest-value global bidder wins k of n items, welfare is
W (k; V ) =
nX
`=n k+1
V` +
n kX
`=1
v`:
In the limit when n ! 1 the sum of local bidders' values will diverge, and we assume that
the highest of the global bidders' values diverges as well, i.e. V = nV^ where V^ is distributed
according to G^(V^ ) = G(V ) with support [0,1]. We can then normalize welfare and prots on
a per-item basis. Suppose the highest-value global bidder wins a fraction  of all items then
normalized welfare is W (; V^ ) = limn!1W (n; nV^ )=n and the global bidder's normalized value
of winning a fraction  of all items is V() = limn!1 (n)V^ . Assumption 2 implies that ()
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is convex, and, hence, so is V(). To simplify notation, below we write V and G() instead of V^
and G^() to indicate the normalized value and its distribution.
The welfare maximizing fraction of items assigned to the highest-value global bidder now
follows from W (V )  max W (; V ), or, equivalently,
W (V ) = max
0 1
V() +
Z 1
F ( 1)()
vdF (v); (3.1)
where we used that in the limit when n grows large, v(1 )n is asymptotically normally distributed
with mean F ( 1)() and variance of order 1=n (David and Nagajara, 2003). The solution to (3.1)
is denoted (V ) = argmax(W (; V )) so that W (V ) =W ((V ); V ).
In the SAA, local bidders drop out at a known rate, e.g. at price level p a total of F (p) local
bidders have dropped out. Suppose there is only one global bidder (K = 1). The global bidder's
optimal strategy is to bid up to a level B1(V ) that maximizes her per-item prot:
1(V ) = V(F (B1(V ))) 
Z B1(V )
0
vdF (v): (3.2)
Note that 1(V ) = W (F (B1(V )); V )   E(v) so the global bidder's optimal drop-out level is
simply B1(V ) = F ( 1)((V )).
Next consider the case of multiple global bidders. First, let K = 2. The optimal drop-out
level B2(V ) follows by requiring that the marginal benets and costs of staying in a little longer
(by bidding as of type V + ) cancel. This deviation aects the outcome only when the rival
global bidder drops out in between (with probability g(V )), in which case the net benet is
V(F (B2(V ))) B2(V )F (B2(V )) +
Z B1(V )
B2(V )
(V 0(F (v))  v)dF (v) = 0:
Here the rst term reects the value of the F (B2(V )) items the global bidder wins when her rival
drops out, the second term is how much she pays for them, and the third term is her continuation
prot when she proceeds to win additional items by bidding up to B1(V ). Integrating this last
term and using the denition of W (V ) shows that B2(V ) solves
B2(V )F (B2(V )) +
Z 1
B2(V )
vdF (v) W (V ) = 0: (3.3)
The left side of (3.3) is strictly increasing in B2(V ) so the solution is unique. We next show that
B2(V )  B1(V ). Evaluating the left side of (3.3) at B2(V ) = B1(V ) yields
B1(V )F (B1(V ))  V(F (B1(V )) = (V )F ( 1)((V ))  V((V ))
 (V )(F ( 1)((V ))  V 0((V )))
= 0;
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where the equality in the rst line follows from the denition of B1(V ), the weak inequality in
the second line follows from convexity of V , and the equality in the third line follows from the
rst-order condition for (V ), see (3.1).15 Since the left side of (3.3) is strictly increasing in
B2(V ) this implies that B2(V )  B1(V ), with strict inequality when there are complementarities
and V() is strictly convex.
Finally, when K  3, the marginal equation that determines BK(V ) follows by requiring that
the marginal benets and costs of staying in a little longer (e.g. by bidding as of type V + )
cancel. This deviation aects the outcome only when all rival global bidders drop out in between,
and the resulting marginal equation is the same as when K = 2.
Example 2. Suppose local bidders' values are uniformly distributed and a global bidder's value
of winning a fraction  of the items is given by V() =  V . When 1   < 2, the optimal drop-
out levels are B1(V ) = min(1; (V )1=(2 )) and BK(V ) = min(
p
2V   1;
q
2=  1(V )1=(2 ))
for K  2. When   2, B1(V ) = 1
V1
2
and BK(V ) =
p
2V   11
V1
2
for K  2, where
1 denotes an indicator function. With extreme complementarities ( = 1), these results are
readily extended to general distributions of the local bidders' values: B1(V ) = 1VE(v) and
B2(V ) solves
R 1
B2(V ) F (y)dy = 1  V for V  E(v) and is zero otherwise.
Since B1(V ) maximizes welfare the SAA is fully ecient in the limit when the number of items
grows large. Surprisingly, the SAA also generates the same revenue as the VCG mechanism in
this limit. To glean some insight for this result, note that (3.3) implies
B2(Z)F (B2(Z)) +
Z B1(V )
B2(Z)
ydF (y) = W (Z) 
Z 1
B1(V )
ydF (y):
On the left side is the SAA payment of the global bidder with the highest value V when the
second-highest of the global bidders' values is Z, and on the right side is the corresponding Vick-
rey payment.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 & 2, the SAA becomes fully ecient and yields the same
seller revenue and bidder prots as the VCG mechanism when the number of items grows large.
Remark 1. Since the global bidders' optimal drop-out levels are independent of the value distri-
bution G(), Propositions 1 and 4 directly apply when there are asymmetries among the global
bidders' value distributions. Also the equivalence result of Proposition 5 extends to the asym-
metric case (seller's revenue and the winning global bidder's prot are aected by asymmetries
but not eciency or the local bidders' prots, see the expressions in the proof of Proposition 5).
15To be precise, the equality in the third line holds only for interior solutions. To account for possible boundary
solutions, note that for (V ) = 0 the expression in the second line vanishes. Furthermore, if (V ) = F (B1(V )) =
1, then the global bidder's optimal drop-out level is determined solely by the event when other global bidders
drop out and B1(V ) = B2(V ) = V(1).
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In the next section we show that Assumptions 1 and 2 are necessary for the SAA to be ecient
in the limit. The intuition for this limit result is that the global bidders face no exposure with
respect to each other because of the convexity assumption and they face no exposure with respect
to the local bidders whose behavior becomes deterministic by the law of large numbers. It is
important to point out, however, that it is the dynamic nature of the SAA that allows the global
bidders to avoid the exposure problem. Since B2(V )  B1(V ), the global bidder with the second-
highest value drops out before any of the local bidders that are part of the ecient allocation
do. In contrast, in a sealed-bid version of the SAA (Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996) global bidders
suer from the exposure problem and generally obtain less than the socially-optimal number of
items, even in large auctions.16 The advantage of the dynamic SAA over sealed-bid formats in
the setting characterized by Assumptions 1 and 2 is an important new insight that complements
the usual motivation for the SAA when common-value elements are present.17
4. More General Environments
An important virtue of the SAA is that it facilitates substitution: the items are put up for
sale simultaneously and the auction does not close until bidding on all items has stopped. As a
result, bidders can switch back and forth between items in response to developing prices without
having to worry that certain items are gone because they did not bid on them. This virtue played
no role in the analysis above where each local bidder had a specic (regional) interest and after
the local bidder dropped out, the market for an item remained inactive regardless of the prices
of other items. One extension studied in this section is to assume that items are substitutes for
local bidders so that price arbitrage will result in similar prices for the items.
Another extension is to consider market sharing among global bidders. In the analysis above,
global bidders have an interest in all items and the value of each item increases the more items
are won. Due to this convexity assumption only the highest-value global bidder obtains any
items. In this section, we study the case where each global bidder needs only a subset of the
items, which implies that global bidders' valuation functions are no longer convex. We consider
the case when market sharing is feasible and the tting problems that arise when it is not.
16An ecient outcome of the simultaneous sealed-bid second-price auction (SSA) dictates that global bidders
place identical \uniform" bids for all items. Suppose not and some global bidder's bid Bi for item i is less than
her bid Bj for item j 6= i. Then with positive probability Bi < vi < vj < Bj and other global bidders' bids for
items i and j are lower than Bi and Bj respectively. In this case, the lower-value local bidder i wins an item and
the higher-value local bidder j does not, which is inecient. Hence, a necessary condition for full eciency is
that global bidders place uniform bids. In the Supplemental Material we show that while it is an equilibrium for
global bidders to bid uniformly in the SSA, such uniform bids are not sucient to ensure eciency with two or
more global bidders { due to the exposure problem, global bidders win fewer items than is socially optimal.
17This positive aspect is somewhat reminiscent of results by Compte and Jehiel (2007) who show that a dynamic
(single-unit) auction raises more revenue than a sealed-bid format when bidders have to acquire costly information
to determine the object's value. The intuition is that even when ex ante competition is strong, the possibility to
observe that few competitors are left in the auction can create strong incentives for information acquisition.
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As we demonstrate below, these extensions exacerbate the exposure problem. With price
arbitrage, the highest-value local bidder will drive up the prices for all items, making it dicult
for the global bidder to acquire a large collection of items. When there is a tting problem, global
bidders run the risk of \mutually destructive bidding," i.e. when global bidders compete ercely
for their desired combination and losers end up paying for inferior subsets. Finally, when market
sharing is feasible, global bidders may follow a strategy of mutual forbearance in order to keep
prices low, at the expense of eciency and the local bidders. As we will show, the aggravated
exposure problem causes the SAA to perform dramatically worse than the VCG mechanism.
4.1. Substitutes and Complements
In this section we assume local bidders want at most one item and value all items the same
(perfect substitutes).18 The global bidder has super-additive values as before (complements).
Assumption 1' (substitutability). Local bidder i = 1; : : : ; n wants a single item and values
all items the same.
Intuitively, the exposure problem is worse under this setup since local bidders will switch licenses19
and drive up their prices uniformly until they drop out20 { the global bidder will thus have to
pay the value of the last local bidder that dropped out for all the items she wins.21
Proposition 6. The global bidder's optimal drop-out level B1k(V ) maximizes 
1
k(V; p), where the
payos satisfy the recursive relation
1k(V; p) =
Z B1k(V )
p
f1k 1(V; vk) + (Vk   vk)gdFk(vkjp)
 (n  k)
Z 1
p
fmin(vk; B1k(V ))  pgdFk(vkjp); (4.1)
with 10(V; p) = 0.
18It is useful to illustrate the SAA rules of Section 2 for the substitutes environment. For simplicity, suppose
there is one local and one global bidder and prices go up by at most  in each round that lasts  seconds. In the
rst round, prices are 0 and the global bidder bids for all items and the local bidder bids for, say, item 1. Then
the price for item 1 is raised by  while all other prices stay at 0. The global bidder is the provisional winner
on items 2; : : : ; n. In the second round, the global bidder again bids for all items while the local bidder switches
to, say, item 2. Now the global bidder becomes the provisional winner on items 1 and 3; : : : ; n. This process
continues until either the local or the global bidder drops out. If the local bidder drops out, the global bidder
wins all items. If the global bidder drops out, the local bidder only wins the item for which she bids in the round
that the global bidder drops out. For example, if the global bidder drops out in round 3, the global bidder is the
provisional winner for items 1 and 2 (ties are settled in favor of global bidders) as well as items 4; : : : ; n, so the
local bidder is assigned only item 3. The continuous format studied here corresponds to the limit ! 0.
19The activity rule for local bidders is modied so that they can compete for any item.
20In FCC auction #4, for instance, a single bidder drove up the prices on many items before dropping out of
the auction and winning nothing.
21The Bayes-Nash equilibria derived in this section are supported by beliefs that global bidders' drop-out levels
are based on the lowest current price. As a result, local bidders have no incentive to deviate from driving up the
prices in a uniform manner (perfect arbitrage).
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Note that if the global bidder is successful in winning an additional item (i.e. when vk < B
1
k(V ))
then she gains Vk and pays vk, and the price increase of the (n k) items the global bidder would
anyhow win is (vk   p). Otherwise, the price increase for these items is (B1k(V )  p).
The prot functions in Proposition 6 are not necessarily concave unlike their counterparts in
Proposition 1, which do not have the additional term in the second line of (4.1). As a result,
the drop-out levels that maximize prots are not necessarily interior solutions. An exception is
when all local bidders are active (k = n) since then the second line of (4.1) disappears.
Example 1 continued. Suppose n = 2 and local bidders' values are uniformly distributed.
For k = 1, Proposition 6 implies 11(V; p) = (B
1
1(V )   p)(V1   1)=(1   p), which is maximized
at B11(V ) = 1V11 (recall that the bidder drops out at maxfp;B11(V )g, i.e. the bidder drops out
immediately when B11(V ) < p). Therefore, the continuation prot is 
1
1(V; p) = (V1   1)1V11
and the rst-order condition for k = 2
B12(V ) = V2 +
1
1(V;B
1
2(V ));
yields B12(V ) = V2 + (V1   1)1V11. Note that the optimal drop-out levels are lower than those
in the original Example 1, which reects the aggravated exposure problem in this setup. In par-
ticular, the global bidder's drop-out levels no longer maximize expected welfare. This example
can be extended to more than two local bidders when complementarities are extreme.
Proposition 7. When n  2 local bidders' values are uniformly distributed and complementari-
ties are extreme, the global bidder's optimal drop-out level is given by
B1n(V ) =
8<: 0 if V1 < n  1V   (n  1) if V1  n  1
and B1k(V ) = 1 for 1  k < n and V  n  1.
To summarize, the global bidder drops out of the auction immediately unless her value exceeds
n  1.22 Clearly, with many items this outcome is very inecient since the expected value of all
the items to the local bidders is only n=2. We next generalize this ineciency result to more
general distributions and valuation functions.
Proposition 8. Under Assumptions 1' & 2, the global bidder wins fewer items than is socially
optimal when there are complementarities. Compared to the VCG mechanism, the SAA is (i)
inecient, (ii) may yield less revenue, (iii) benets local bidders, and (iv) hurts the global bidder.
22Even if one of the local bidders drops out at a price of 0, the global bidder still expects to pay n times the
expected value of the expected value of the highest of n  1 local bidders' values. So the expected payment would
be n(n  1)=n, which explains why n  1 is the threshold value for the global bidder to start bidding.
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Example 2 (continued). Recall that, for 1   < 2, the socially optimal fraction of items
won by the global bidder is min(1; (V )1=(2 )), while in equilibrium, it is only (1
2
V )1=(2 ).23 So
the global bidder wins fewer items than is socially optimal even with linear valuations (demand
reduction). For   2, the socially optimal fraction is 1
V1
2
while in equilibrium the global
bidder wins no items irrespective of her value.24 Due to the aggravated exposure problem in this
environment with complements and substitutes, the global bidder drops out immediately.
4.2. Fitting Problems
In this section and the next, we keep Assumption 1 (i.e. local bidders' interests are xed)
but we drop the convexity Assumption 2. In particular, we consider large auctions with two
\medium-sized" global bidders who each demand fewer than all items. Complementarities are
extreme, i.e. a global bidder has no value for less than  of the items, nor does a global bidder
value additional items beyond an  fraction. Because of the latter, global bidders' valuations are
no longer convex.25
Assumption 2' (regional complementarities). For global bidder j = 1; 2, the value of
obtaining a fraction  of the items is
Vj() =
8<: Vj if   0 if  < 
for some 0 <  < 1.
We rst study the case  > 1=2 so that there is a \tting problem," i.e. it is not possible for
both global bidders to win their desired fraction of items. As a result, global bidders that drop
out have to pay for (worthless) items if fewer than 1   local bidders are active.26 This lowers
the value of dropping out and may cause global bidders to stay in at prices that exceed their
values. Such behavior can be mutually destructive since prices may become so high that even
the winning global bidder incurs a loss.
Consider the case where only one global bidder is active and suppose this global bidder's value
is low enough so that, in equilibrium, the global bidder drops out before a fraction  of the local
23The global bidder's objective is to maximize V    2, which yields (12V )1=(2 ) for 1   < 2.
24For   2, the interior solution is a local minimum, while  = 0 yields 0 and  = 1 yields V   1  0.
25Global bidders can compete for at most an  fraction of the items. As in Section 2, the prices for active items
rise uniformly and a global bidder's strategy is characterized by a single drop-out level.
26Due to the SAA's activity rule, global bidders will compete for exactly an  fraction of the items. The
Bayes-Nash equilibrium considered here involves perfect arbitrage, i.e. global bidders switch among items and
drive up prices uniformly (this equilibrium is supported by beliefs that global bidders' drop-out levels depend
on the lowest current price). With 2 > 1, the losing global bidder, who fails to win  items at the end of the
auction, will necessarily win some of the items once fewer than 1    local bidders are active. We do not claim
uniqueness, i.e. other (asymmetric) equilibria may exist.
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bidders has dropped out. In this case, the optimal drop-out level is akin to that of Example 2
in Section 3. Dene V () = E(vjF (v)  ) then B1(V ) = F ( 1)()1VV (). Similarly, from
(3.3), B2(V ) is zero when V < V () and for V  V () it follows from
Z F ( 1)()
B2(V )
F (y)dy = F ( 1)()  V
cf. Example 2. This solution, however, only applies when at least a fraction 1    of the local
bidders are active, which requires B2(V )  F ( 1)() or V  V () = F ( 1)().
We next determine B2(V ) for V  V (). Consider a global bidder with value V who bids
as if her value is V + . The eect of this deviation is twofold. First, with probability g(V )
the other global bidder drops out in between and the deviation results in a winning payo of
V   B2(V ) instead of a losing payo of  B2(V )(F (B2(V ))   ). Second, with probability
(1 G(V )) the other global bidder has a higher value and the deviation simply raises the costs
of the items that are won. Equating the marginal cost and benet of the deviation yields
g(V )

V  B2(V )(2  F (B2(V )))

= (1 G(V ))

B2(V )(F (B2(V ))  )
0
The right side vanishes at V = 1, which implies B2(1) = 1=(2   1) > 1. The intuition is that
when the price exceeds 1, local bidders are no longer active so the global bidder is assigned a
fraction 1  of the items when she drops out or a fraction  of the items when she wins. Hence,
a global bidder with V = 1 continues to bid as long as the cost of winning an additional 2  1
of the items is less than 1. The global bidders' aggressive bids can cause losses, even for the
winning bidder. For example, if global bidders have values close to 1 then the winning bidder's
prot is 1  =(2   1) =  (1  )=(2   1) < 0, which is also the prot for the losing bidder.
The global bidders' aggressive bids do not necessarily translate into higher seller revenue.
Proposition 9. Suppose Assumptions 1 & 2' hold and 1=2 <  < 1 so that there is a tting
problem. Compared to the VCG mechanism, the SAA is (i) inecient, (ii) may yield less revenue
(and yields less revenue when  is high enough), (iii) hurts local bidders, and (iv) creates a positive
probability of losses for both losing and winning global bidders.
4.3. Market Sharing
When   1=2, market sharing is possible and global bidders have an alternative to dropping
out: they can \yield" by not bidding for the same items as the other global bidder and instead
compete with the remaining local bidders to obtain a fraction  of the items. Compared to
dropping out, yielding results in an extra payo of
V  
Z F ( 1)(2)
B2(V )
vdF (v) (4.2)
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i.e. the value of winning the additional items minus their cost. Note that the additional payo
(4.2) is strictly increasing in V . Furthermore, (4.2) is negative when evaluated at V = V ()
and positive when evaluated at V = 1.27 So there is a unique V (), which satises V () <
V () < 1, where the global switches from dropping out to yielding.
To determine the rst-order condition for V  V (), consider a global bidder with value
V who bids as if her value is V + . With probability g(V ) the other global bidder drops out in
between and the deviation results in a winning payo of V  B2(V ) instead of a yielding payo
of V   R F ( 1)(2)B2(V ) vdF (v) B2(V )(F (B2(V )) ). Second, with probability (1 G(V )) the other
global bidder has a higher value and the deviation simply raises the costs of the (F (B2(V )) )
items that are eventually won. Equating the marginal cost and benet yields
g(V )
Z F ( 1)(2)
B2(V )
vdF (v) B2(V )(2  F (B2(V )))

= (1 G(V )) (F (B2(V ))  )(B2(V ))0
The right side vanishes at V = 1, which implies that B2(1) = F ( 1)(2) < 1. The intuition
is that at a price of F ( 1)(2) a fraction of 2 of the local bidders has dropped out, so global
bidders of all types prefer to yield and divide the market rather than to compete further.
To summarize, in equilibrium, the price at which the global bidders divide the market is less
than F ( 1)(2). This low price contrasts with the price that would have resulted in a single-price
clock auction, for instance, where both global bidders would have to pay F ( 1)(2) to drive 2
local bidders out of the market. We next demonstrate that the price at which global bidders
yield is also too low from a welfare viewpoint. In the VCG mechanism, the global bidder with
the lowest value, Z, would obtain a fraction  of the items when
Z  V o() 
Z F ( 1)(2)
F ( 1)()
tdF (t)
In equilibrium, the lowest-value global bidder obtains a fraction  of the items when Z  V (),
where V () < V o().28 Hence, there are two value ranges where the lowest-value global bidder
obtains too many items. When V () < Z < V () she obtains a strictly positive fraction
(although strictly less than ) while it is optimal that she wins nothing. When V () < Z <
V o() she obtains an  fraction of the items, while it is optimal that she wins nothing.
Proposition 10. Suppose Assumptions 1 & 2' hold and 0 <   1=2 so that market sharing is
feasible. Compared to the VCG mechanism, the SAA is (i) inecient, (ii) may yield less revenue,
(iii) hurts local bidders, and (iv) benets the global bidders who divide the market at low prices.
27Recall that B2(V ()) = F ( 1)() so (4.2) evaluated at V () becomes
R F ( 1)(2)
F ( 1)() (F (v)  2)dv < 0.
28Since V () =
R F ( 1)(2)
B2(V ()) tdF (t) <
R F ( 1)(2)
B2(V ()) tdF (t) = V
o() where the rst equality follows from
the denition of V (), the inequality follows since V () > V (), and the second equality follows since
B2(V ()) = F ( 1)().
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Figure 2. The Optimal Drop-Out Level, B2(V ), for  = 2=5 (top left) and  = 3=4 (top right).
Dierences in Welfare (middle left), Revenue (middle right), Global Bidders' Prots (bottom left), and
Local Bidders' Prots (bottom right) as Percentages of Maximal Welfare for 0    1.
Example 3. Suppose the local and global bidders' values are uniformly distributed. The top-
right panel of Figure 2 shows the optimal drop-out level, B2(V ), for  = 3=4 and 0  V  1, and
illustrates the degree to which mutually destructive bidding can occur. For instance, a bidder
with a value of 1 is willing to stay in until the price levels reaches 2, at which point the bidder
wins but her prot is 1   2(3=4) < 0. The top-left panel of Figure 2 shows the global bidder's
optimal drop-out levels for  = 2=5 and 0  V  1, and illustrates the extent to which global
bidders divide the market at low prices. For instance, a global bidder with a value of V = 1=2
yields at a per-item price of approximately 0.6, at which point the cost of the 2/5 fraction of
items the global bidder is competing for is roughly half the value.
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 2 illustrate the performance dierences of the SAA
and VCG mechanisms for 0    1. The middle-left panel shows welfare dierences, the
middle-right panel shows revenue dierences, the lower-left panel shows dierences in the global
bidders' prots, and the lower-right panel shows dierences in local bidders' prots. In each of
these four panels, the relevant dierence is normalized by the (maximal possible) welfare of the
VCG mechanism. Note that both welfare and revenue are lower in the SAA for all values of ,
i.e. whether or not market sharing is feasible. Furthermore, the local bidders are always worse
o while the global bidders benet only when market sharing is feasible.
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5. Conclusions
The simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) is generally considered one of the most successful
applications of game theory. Since its initial use in the Personal Communication Services (PCS)
auction conducted by the FCC in 1994, the SAA has become the dominant format to conduct
large-scale spectrum auctions and it has raised hundreds of billions worldwide. In their review
of the process that shaped the rst PCS auction, McAfee, McMillan, and Wilkie (2010) recall
that while the economic literature generally favored an ascending format, \the case was far
from transparent." Indeed, the typical motivation for dynamic formats is that in common-value
environments they allow bidders to rene their value estimates by observing others' bids (Milgrom
and Weber, 1982). However, a major concern in many of the spectrum auctions conducted to date
is that due to the item-by-item competition that underlies the SAA, global bidders interested
in acquiring large combinations face an exposure problem { when competing aggressively for a
combination of items, a global bidder may incur a loss when winning an inferior subset.
This paper introduces a tractable model of local/global competition that allows for a general
Bayes-Nash equilibrium analysis of the exposure problem. We rst assume each local bidder
values a dierent item and global bidders' values are convex. Our setup is general in that it
allows for arbitrary numbers of local and global bidders, arbitrary distributions of local and
global bidders' values, and a general convex valuation function to capture global bidders' value
complementarities. For this environment, we demonstrate that the exposure problem results in
perverse revenue properties of the SAA. In particular, the SAA may yield non-core outcomes
in which local bidders obtain the items at low prices { prices that may fall short of Vickrey
prices. Moreover, the seller's revenue may decline as more bidders enter the auction. These
shortcomings, which are well known for the benchmark Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism
(e.g. Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006), were hitherto not known for the SAA simply because a general
equilibrium analysis did not exist.
The similarity between the SAA and VCG mechanisms becomes even more pronounced in
auctions with a large number of items, as is the case in many FCC spectrum auctions. In the
limit, the SAA is fully ecient and yields identical prots for the bidders and the seller as the
VCG mechanism. Importantly, it is the dynamic nature of the SAA that enables the global
bidders to avoid the exposure problem as it allows the global bidder with the second-highest
value to drop out before any of the ecient local bidders do. This is not possible in a sealed-bid
version of the SAA (Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996) where global bidders suer from the exposure
problem and generally obtain fewer items than is socially optimal. The advantage of the dynamic
SAA over sealed-bid formats in this setting is an important new insight that complements the
usual motivation for the SAA when common-value elements are present.
We also consider an environment where the items are perfect substitutes for local bidders. In
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this case, local bidders switch licenses and drive up prices in a uniform manner until they drop
out. Such behavior is commonly observed in actual spectrum auctions, e.g. Ausubel and Cramton
(2002) note \...in the SAA used for spectrum licenses, there is a strong tendency toward arbitrage
of the prices for identical items. Indeed, in the PCS auction of July 1994, similar licenses were on
average priced within 0.3 percent of the mean price for that category of license." We demonstrate
that the exposure problem is much more severe in this case and that the global bidder always
wins fewer items than is socially optimal. Indeed, in large auctions it can be optimal for the
global bidder to drop out right away, with dramatic eects for revenue and eciency of the
SAA. Hence, for this arguably more realistic setting with substitutes and complements, it is the
dynamic feature of the SAA that creates a severe exposure problem for global bidders because
it allows high-value local bidders to drive the prices up on all licenses. In contrast, the impact
of one or more high-value local bidders would be limited in a sealed-bid format.
Finally, we relax the assumption that global bidders' values are convex and consider an
environment with medium-sized global bidders who demand fewer than all items. We show that
the SAA is generally inecient whether or not market sharing is feasible. When it is, high-value
global bidders follow a strategy of mutual forbearance to divide the market at low prices. When
it is not, high-value global bidders engage in mutually destructive bidding, which drives out
high-value local bidders and may cause even the winning global bidder to incur a loss. In both
cases, the SAA yields lower welfare and typically less seller revenue than the VCG mechanism.
To summarize, our approach enables us to quantify the adverse eects of the exposure prob-
lem in the SAA across a broad array of bidding environments. We nd that the SAA generally
performs worse than the benchmark VCG mechanism, e.g. when both substitutes and comple-
ments play a role, when there are tting problems, or when global bidders can divide the market.
Our ndings contrast with the superior performance of the SAA in a substitutes-only environ-
ment (e.g. Milgrom, 2000), and reinforce the interest of policy makers in more exible auction
institutions that accommodate bidders' synergistic preferences.
22
A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that
B1k(V ) = argmaxb
nZ b
p
(1k 1(V; vk) + (Vk   vk))dFk(vkjp)
o
(A.1)
The necessary rst-order condition is B1k(V ) = Vk+
1
k 1(V;B
1
k(V )), which has a unique solution
since the right side is decreasing in B1k(V ) and the left side is increasing. Moreover, the solution
corresponds to a maximum since the second derivative of the objective function in (A.1) evaluated
at b = B1k(V ) is negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove, by induction, that W 1k (V; p) = 
1
k(V; p) + kE(vjv > p) for
all k  1. In the main text we have shown it is true for k = 1. For k  2 we have:
W 1k (V; p) =
Z B1k(V )
p
(W 1k 1(V; vk) + Vk)dFk(vkjp) +
Z 1
B1
k
(V )
kX
i=1
vi dFk(vkjp)
=
Z B1k(V )
p
(1k 1(V; vk) + Vk   vk)dFk(vkjp)
+
Z B1k(V )
p
((k   1)E(vjv > vk) + vk)dFk(vkjp) +
Z 1
B1
k
(V )
kX
i=1
vi dFk(vkjp)
= 1k(V; p) + kE(vjv > p)
In the rst line, the second term on the right side occurs when the global bidder drops out before
the lowest-value local bidder (among the k active local bidders), in which case all remaining items
are awarded to the local bidders. The rst term corresponds to the case where the local bidder
drops out rst (at price level vk), in which case the social planner optimizes the continuation
welfareW 1k 1(V; vk) with one fewer local bidder. In going from the rst to the second line we used
the induction hypothesis, and in going from the second to the third line we used the recursive
property of the global bidder's prot, see Proposition 1. Since welfare and the global bidder's
prot dier only by a constant, B1k(V ) is chosen in a socially optimal manner. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that W SAA(V ) = W 1n(V; 0) and 
SAA(V ) = 1n(V; 0) dier by
nE(v), see the proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the VCG mechanism assigns k of the n licenses
to the global bidder for which she pays the opportunity cost, which is the sum of the k lowest
local bidders' values. Let ^V CG and W^ V CG denote the global's prot and welfare respectively
as a function of the entire prole of bidders' valuations: ^V CG =
Pk
`=1(Vn `+1   vn `+1) and
W^ V CG =
Pk
`=1 Vn `+1 +
Pn
`=k+1 vn `+1, so W^
V CG = ^V CG(V ) +
Pn
k=1 vk. Taking expectations
with respect to local bidders' value shows that the global's expected prot V CG(V ) and expected
welfare W V CG(V ) dier by nE(v). This establishes (2.3). The equality in (2.4) now follows from
the \accounting identity" R =W     . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. When (n  k) local bidders have dropped out and k are still active,
a global bidder's optimal drop-out level is determined by
B2k(V ) = argmaxb
nZ (B2k)( 1)(b)
(B2
k
)( 1)(p)

1k(V;B
2
k(W )) +
nX
`=k+1
(V`  B2k(W ))

dG(W )K 1
o
(A.2)
The necessary rst-order condition yields (2.5), which has a unique solution since the left side is
strictly decreasing in B2k(V ). Moreover, the solution corresponds to a maximum since the second
derivative of the objective function in (A.2) evaluated at b = B2k(V ) is negative. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2 (continued). We rst prove that competition among global bidders
lowers drop-out levels.
Lemma A1. B2k(V )  B1k+1(V ) for k = 0; 1; : : : ; n  1.
Proof. For k = n  1, this follows from (2.6). To prove the lemma for k  n  2 note that when
B2k(V ) = B
1
k+1(V ) the left-side of (2.5) is equal to
1k(V;B
1
k+1(V )) +
nX
`=k+1
(V`  B1k+1(V )) =
nX
`=k+2
(V`  B1k+1(V )) 
nX
`=k+2
(V`   Vk+1)  0
where the rst equality follows since 1k(V;B
1
k+1(V )) = B
1
k+1(V )  Vk+1 (see Proposition 1), the
rst inequality follows since B1k+1(V )  Vk+1, and the second inequality follows from Assumption
2. Since the left side of (2.5) is strictly decreasing in B2k(V ) the above inequality implies that
B2k(V )  B1k+1(V ) for k = 0; 1; : : : ; n  1. Q.E.D.
Next, consider the global bidder with the highest value, V , and suppose in the optimal allocation
this global bidder is assigned k items. Once other global bidders have dropped out, social
optimality follows from Proposition 2, i.e. B1k(V ) > vk for k = n  k+1; : : : ; n and B1k(V ) < vk
for k = 1; : : : ; n k. We need to show that all other global bidders drop out before B1n k+1. This
follows since for all V 0 < V and k = n  k + 1; : : : ; n, we have BKk (V 0) = B2k(V 0)  B1k+1(V 0) 
B1k(V
0) < B1k(V )  B1n k+1(V ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The best global bidder wins F (B1(V )) = (V ) items so welfare is
maximized: W SAA(V ) =W (V ). To determine the best global bidder's prot note that she wins
an optimal fraction of items F (B1(V )), which she values at V(F (B1(V ))), and for which she pays
Z V
0
fB2(Z)F (B2(Z)) +
Z B1(V )
B2(Z)
ydF (y)gdG(ZjV )K 1
where G(ZjV ) = G(Z)=G(V ). Here the rst term in the integral corresponds to the items the
best global bidder wins (all at once) when the second-best global bidder drops out at B2(Z),
and the second term corresponds to the items she wins when local bidders subsequently drop out
between B2(Z) and B1(V ). Using (3.1) and (3.3), we can rewrite the global bidder's prot as
SAA(V ) =
Z V
0
(W (V ) W (Z))dG(ZjV )K 1
(Note that for K = 1, the expression reduces to W (V ) W (0) = W (V )  E(v).) Local bidders
with values higher than B1(V ) win an item at price B1(V ) and the total prots for the local
bidders as a group therefore are
SAA(V ) =
Z 1
B1(V )
(v  B1(V ))dF (v) =
Z 1
B1(V )
(1  F (v))dv
Finally, revenue follows from R =W    . It is standard to verify that the VCG expressions
for welfare, revenue, and prots are identical to those for the SAA. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. To establish the recursive relation, note that if at price level p there
are k active local bidders then the global bidder will at least win n   k items since n   k local
bidders have already dropped out. If the lowest of the active local bidders' values, vk, is less than
B1k(V ), then the global bidder's gain is the continuation prot 
1
k 1(V; vk) plus Vk   vk for the
additional item she wins, and she has to pay an extra (n   k)(vk   p) for the items she would
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anyhow have won. If vk is greater than B
1
k(V ) then the global bidder wins no additional items
but the price of the (n  k) items she does win is raised from p to B1k(V ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Recall that
B1k(V ) = argmaxb
nZ b
p
(1k 1(V; vk) + (Vk   vk))dFk(vkjp)  (n  k)
Z 1
p
(min(vk; b)  p)dFk(vkjp)
o
The derivative of the term between curly brackets, evaluated at b = B1k(V ), is proportional to
1k 1(V;B
1
k(V )) + Vk  B1k(V ) 
n  k
k
(1 B1k(V )) (A.3)
For k = 1 we have V1 = V and 
1
0 = 0 so the slope is V   (n   1) + (n   2)B11(V ), which is
positive for V  n  1. So prots are increasing in B11(V ) and, hence, maximized at B11(V ) = 1.
We next prove, by induction, that for 1  k < n and V  n  1, the global bidder bids up to 1.
Suppose with k 1 active local bidders, the global bidder bids up to 1. To derive 1k 1(V;B1k(V ))
note that the global bidder pays B1k(V ) + (1 B1k(V ))(k   1)=k for each of the k   1 additional
items she wins plus an additional (1  B1k(V ))(k   1)=k for each of the n  (k   1) items she is
already winning:
1k 1(V;B
1
k(V )) = V   (n  1) + (n  k)B1k(V ) +
n  k
k
(1 B1k(V ))
For k > 1, (A.3) becomes (recall that complementarities are extreme so Vk>1 = 0)
V   (n  1) + (n  k   1)B1k(V )
So the slope is positive and the prot increasing in B1k(V ) when V  n 1 and k  n 1. Hence,
B1k(V ) = 1 for 1  k < n and V  n   1. Furthermore, for k = n and V  n   1, the optimal
bid follows from the rst-order condition that the slope is zero: B1n(V ) = V   (n  1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. When local bidders treat the items as substitutes, the global bidder's
optimal drop-out level satises B(V ) = argmaxb(V(F (b))   bF (b)), compared to B1(V ) =
argmaxb(V(F (b)) 
R b
0 vdF (v)), when each local bidder is interested in a dierent item. Note that
the objective functions in the maximization problems dier by
R b
0 F (v)dv so the solutions dier
unless B(V ) = B1(V ) = 0, which can hold only for low values of V . When B(V ) 6= B1(V ), the
rst optimization problem implies
V(F (B(V ))) B(V )F (B(V )) > V(F (B1(V ))) B1(V )F (B1(V ))
and the second optimization problem implies
V(F (B1(V ))) 
Z B1(V )
0
vdF (v) > V(F (B(V ))) 
Z B(V )
0
vdF (v)
Hence, we have
B1(V )F (B1(V )) B(V )F (B(V )) > V(F (B1(V )))  V(F (B(V )))
>
Z B1(V )
B(V )
vdF (v)
= B1(V )F (B1(V )) B(V )F (B(V )) 
Z B1(V )
B(V )
F (v)dv
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which implies B(V ) < B1(V ). Hence, the global bidder wins fewer items (F (B(V ))) than is
socially optimal (F (B1(V ))). Also, the lower bid of the global bidder implies higher prots for
the local bidders. An envelope theorem argument implies that the global bidder's prot is lower
since the fraction of items the global bidder wins is less. Finally, revenue may be lower (see, e.g.,
Example 2 continued) or higher depending on distributional assumptions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. The SAA and VCG yield the same allocations, and the same prots,
when the lowest of the two global bidders' values, Z, is less than V (). When Z  V (),
the lowest-value global bidder bids up to B2(Z) > F ( 1)() thereby driving local bidders with
values between F ( 1)() and B2(Z) out of the market. Hence, the welfare dierence is
W V CG  W SAA =
Z 1
V ()
Z B2(Z)
F ( 1)()
vdF (v)dGmin(Z)
where Gmin(Z) = 1  (1 G(Z))2. Note that the right side is strictly positive. Furthermore, if
the lowest-value global bidder had dropped out at F ( 1)(), the local bidders' prot would have
been
R 1
F ( 1)()(y   F ( 1)())dF (y) =
R 1
F ( 1)()(1   F (y))=f(y)dF (y). Instead, the local bidders'
prot is
R 1
B2(Z)(y  B2(Z))dF (y) =
R 1
B2(Z)(1  F (y))=f(y)dF (y). The dierence
V CG   SAA =
Z 1
V ()
Z B2(Z)
F ( 1)()
1  F (v)
f(v)
dF (v)dGmin(Z)
is strictly positive. In contrast, equality of the global bidders' prots, V CG = SAA, follows
from an envelope argument since the probability of obtaining  items is the same under the VCG
and SAA mechanisms (i.e. the probability that a global bidder with value V  V () obtains 
items is G(V )). Finally, the revenue dierence follows from the identity R =W     :
RV CG  RSAA =
Z 1
V ()
Z B2(Z)
F ( 1)()
(v   1  F (v)
f(v)
)dF (v)dGmin(Z)
The revenue dierence is intuitive: under SAA, the seller no longer collects the marginal revenues,
MR(V )  v  (1 F (v))=f(v), for local bidders with values between F ( 1)() and B2(Z). These
marginal revenues can be negative for low values of v but are positive for high values of v. For
example, for uniformly distributed values, the marginal revenues are MR(v) = 2v   1 > 0 for
v > 1=2. Hence, in the uniform case, the seller's revenue under SAA is always lower than under
VCG since F ( 1)() =  > 1=2. More generally, a sucient (but not necessary) condition for
revenues to be higher under VCG is that  > max(1=2; F (MR( 1)(0))). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. The SAA and VCG yield the same allocations, and the same prots,
when the lowest of the two global bidders' values, Z, is less than V (). The dierence in welfare
when Z  V () follows from the discussion in the main text (see the proof of Proposition 9):
W V CG  W SAA =
Z V ()
V ()
Z B2(Z)
F ( 1)()
vdF (v)dGmin(Z) +
Z V o()
V ()
(V o()  Z)dGmin(Z)
which is strictly positive. Similarly, the dierence in local bidders' prots is
V CG   SAA =
Z V ()
V ()
Z B2(Z)
F ( 1)()
1  F (v)
f(v)
dF (v)dGmin(Z)
+
Z V o()
V ()
Z F ( 1)(2)
F ( 1)()
1  F (v)
f(v)
dF (v)dGmin(Z)
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which is strictly positive. To understand the dierence in the global bidders' prot, note that the
SAA results in a higher probability of obtaining  items than the VCG mechanism. In particular,
under the SAA mechanism this probability is G(V ) for V < V () and 1 for V  V (),
compared to G(V ) for V < V o() and 1 for V  V o() under the VCG mechanism. The global
bidders' prot dierence is therefore
SAA   V CG = 2
Z 1
V ()
Z min(V;V o())
V ()
(1 G(Z))dZdG(V ) =
Z V o()
V ()
1 G(Z)
g(Z)
dGmin(Z)
which is strictly positive. Finally, the expression for the revenue dierence follows from R =
W     :
RV CG  RSAA =
Z V ()
V ()
Z B2(Z)
F ( 1)()
(v   1  F (v)
f(v)
)dF (v)dGmin(Z)
+
Z V o()
V ()
Z F ( 1)(2)
F ( 1)()
(v   1  F (v)
f(v)
)dF (v)dGmin(Z)
which can be either positive (see, e.g., Example 3) or negative depending on distributional
assumptions. Q.E.D.
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